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COMMENT
CONFLICT OF LAWS - FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
APPLICATION TO WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AWARDS
The Conflict of Laws questions in reference to Workmen's
Compensation Acts have called forth numerous decisions from
the courts. The earliest cases held that recovery thereunder
was in the nature of recovery for tort and was governed by
the law of the state of injury'. Opposed to this was the theory
that the relationship was one of contract and was governed
by the law of the state in which the contract was made, regard-
less of the state of injury2 . The more generally accepted view
and the one adopted by the United States Supreme Court is
that the liability is not for tort but is imposed as an incident
of the employment relationship as a cost to be borne by the
business 3.
No difficulty arises where the contract of employment and
the injury take place in the same state, but where the former is
entered into in one state and the latter takes place in another
the problem arises as to what effect, if any, must be given to
the statute of the sister state under the full faith and credit
clause4 . That the state where the injury occurred has jurisdic-
tion to award compensation has been definitely decided in
Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Com-
I Schwartz v. India Rubber Works, [1912] 2 K.B. 299; Gould's Case, 215
Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693 (1913).
2 Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 A. 372; Matter of Post,
216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 351 (1916).
a Alaska Packers' Association v. Industrial Commission of California, 294
U. S. 532 (1935). DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 814
(1936); 2 BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, secs. 398.1-401.3 (1935); GOODRICH,
CONFLICT OF LAWS sec. 98 (1927). It is apparent, then, that apart from full
faith and credit, there is no choice of law problem.
4 U. S. CONST. Art. IV, sec. 1: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each
state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.
And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts,
records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." The Act of May
26, 1790, c. 11, 1 STAT. 122, provided for the proper authentication of the acts,
records and judicial proceedings and declared: "And the said records and judi-
cial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid shall have such faith and credit
given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or
usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be
taken." The Act of March 27, 1804, c. 56, 2 STAT. 298, extended the provisions
of this statute to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the terri-
tories of the United States. These enactments subsequently became secs. 905,
906 of the REV. STAT., U. S. C., tit. 28, secs. 687, 688.
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mission. There an employee of a Massachusetts corporation,
resident of that state and regularly employed there, was in-
jured in the course of his employment while temporarily in
California. The Court held that the California court was not
bound by the full faith and credit clause to apply, contrary
to the policy of its statute, the Massachusetts statute; or to
recognize it as a defense to the claim of an employee under the
California act, which, because the injury was suffered in the
employment there, also purported to be applicable and to give
an exclusive remedy. Few matters, the Court said, could be
deemed more appropriately within a state's concern than an
injury to an employee within its borders. Likewise, in Alaska
Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commissions the
state where the contract of employment is executed was held
to have jurisdiction to make an award. There a non-resident
workman and a packing company doing business in California
executed a contract which provided that the employee would
work for the season in Alaska and that both parties should be
bound by the Alaska Act. Upon the employee's return to Cali-
fornia an award for an injury suffered in Alaska was upheld
on the ground that without a remedy in California courts he
would be remediless and likely to become a public charge there,
thus giving that state a legitimate public interest to make an
award under its own Act.
Under the above holdings it is clear that eithre the state
of employment or the state of injury has jurisdiction to make
an award. However, in the event of either state making such
award could it be interposed as a bar in a subsequent proceed-
ing in the second state under the full faith and credit clause?
The Supreme Court said yes in Magnolia. Petroleum Co. v.
Hunt7. In that case Hunt, resident of Louisiana, entered into a
5 306 U. S. 493 (1939). RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS sec. 399 (1934):
"A workman may recover in a state in which he sustains harm under the
Workmen's Compensation Act of that state although the contract of employment
was made in another state, unless the Act provides in specific words or is so
interpreted as to apply only when the contract of employment is made within
the state."
6294 U. S. 532 (1935). RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS sec. 398 (1934):
"A workman who enters into a contract of employment in a state in which a
Workmen's Compensation Act is in force can recover compensation under the
Act in that state for bodily harm arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment, although the harm was suffered in another state, unless the Act provides
in specific words or is so interpreted as to apply only to bodily harm occurring
within the state."
7 320 U. S. 430 (1943).
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contract of employment there and was sent to Texas where he
was injured. The latter state awarded him compensation and
subsequently he made claim for the same injury in Louisiana.
The insurer set up the Texas award as a bar and invoked the
full faith and credit clause. The Louisiana Board made an
award (its Act providing a higher rate of compensation) after
deducting the amount of the Texas payments. The United
States Supreme Court vacated the second award on the ground
that a final award for compensation under the Texas Act had
the same effect as a judgment and was res judicata as to all
matters which had been or could have been litigated; that since
there was but one injury there was but one cause of action
which merged in the judgment and since the matter was res
judicata in Texas it must be given the same effect elsewhere
as in the case of any other judgment for money in a civil
action". Subsequently in Industrial Commission v. McCartin?
a case came to the Supreme Court for decision where the work-
man was injured in Wisconsin, the contract having been made
in Illinois. A settlement contract was made which expressly
reserved any rights the employee might have under the Wis-
consin Act. This was incorporated in the award. Subsequently
he applied for compensation in Wisconsin and received an
award less the amount received in Illinois. The award was set
aside by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin under the holding in
8 The majority of state courts prior to this decision allowed a second recovery
with deduction of the initial award: Price v. Horton Motor Lines, 201 S. C. 484,
23 S. E. (2d) 744 (1942); Miller v. National Chair Co., 129 N. J. L. 98, 28 A.
(2d) 125 (1942); Salvation Army v. Industrial Commission, 219 Wis. 343, 263
N. W. 349 (1935); Migue's Case, 281 Mass. 373, 183 N. E. 847 (1933); Anderson
v. Jarrett Chambers Co., 210 App. Div. 543, 206 N. Y. Supp. 458 (3rd Dept.
1924).
Seven states expressly allowed it by statute: Florida, FLA. STAT. (1941) sec.
440.09(1); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. (Park et al., 1936) tit. 114, sec. 411; Mary-
land, MD. ANN. CODE (Flack, 1939) art. 101, sec. 80 (3); Ohio, OHIO CODE ANN.
(Throckmorton, Supp. 1943) sec. 1465-68; North Carolina, N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie and Sublett, 1939) sec. 8081; South Carolina, S. C. CODE (1942) sec.
7035-39; Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. (1942) sec. 1887 (37).
It was also sanctioned by the authorities: 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra. note 3, sec.
403.1; DODD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 820; 1 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
TEXT sec. 160 (1941). RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS sec. 403 (1934): "Award
already had under the Workmen's Compensation Act of another state will not
bar a proceeding under an applicable Act, but the amount paid on a prior award
in another state will be credited on the second award." The majority opinion in
the Magnolia Case referred to this section as follows: "This would seem to be
intended as nothing more than a statement of local rules of conflict of laws
when unaffected by the full faith and credit clause, since full faith and credit,
if it does not require that a first award bar a second, would not compel credits
upon the second award of payments made under the first."
9330 U. S. 622 (1947).
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the Magnolia Case. The United States Supreme Court rein-
stated the award and distinguished the Magnolia Case on the
ground that under the Illinois Act the award there was in-
tended to be final and conclusive only as to rights arising in
Illinois, and Wisconsin was free under the full faith and credit
clause to make an award.
At first blush it would appear that the Magnolia Case had
been overruled; however, the Court in the McCartin Case made
it clear that such was not true.10 Although the Texas Board in
the Magnolia Case made no express reservation as to the
rights of the claimant under the Act of a second state, as did
the Illinois Board, the Court stated that such a clause, of it-
self, could not decide the effect to be given the award by the
second state. However, it did rely on it as bearing on the policy
behind the Illinois Act.- Since there is no other appreciable
difference in the statutes of the two states,1 2 it is obvious that
the Magnolia Case turned on the provision in the Texas Act
precluding further recovery in that state if compensation had
been obtained in the state of injury. 13 Apparently then, the two
10 Id. at 623. "In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt this Court had occasion to
consider the effect of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the
United States where awards are sought under the Workmen's Compensation
laws of two states. This case presents another facet of that problem."
11 Id. at 630. The settlement contract which became the award provided:
"This settlement does not affect any rights that applicant may have under the
Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Wisconsin." In reference to this
clause the Court said: "This provision means more than might be implied in the
case of an ordinary judgment or decree. Any party, of course, has the right
to seek another judgment or decree, however inconsistent or futile such an
attempt might be; and it takes no reservation in the original judgment or decree
to give him that right. But when the reservation in this award is read against
the background of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, it becomes clear
that the reservation spells out what we believe to be implicit in that Act - name-
ly, that an Illinois Workmen's Compensation award of the type here involved
does not foreclose an additional award under the laws of another state."
12 "The employees of a subscriber . . . shall have no right of action against
their employer as against any agent, servant or employee of said employer for
damages for personal injuries, . . . but such employees . . . shall look for com-
pensation solely to the association . TEX. ANN. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon,
1941) art. 8306, sec. 3.
"No common law or statutory right to recover damages for injury or death
sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as an employee,
other than the compensationherein provided, shall be available to any employee
who is covered by the provisions of this act. ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd,
1935) c. 48, sec. 143.
13 "If an employee, who has been hired in this state, sustained injury in the
course of his employment he shall be entitled to compensation according to the
law of this state even though such injury was received outside of the state . . .
provided, further, that no recovery can be had by the injured employee hereunder
in the event he has elected to pursue his remedy and recovers in the state where
such injury occurred." TEX. ANN. REV. STAT. (Vernon, 1941) art. 8306, sec. 19.
The majority opinion in the Magnolia Case in speaking of this provision stated:
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cases stand for the proposition that a state can determine
for itself the extent of the extraterritorial application of its
own statute and the Supreme Court will give effect to such
statute without weighing the interest of a second state in the
matter. That a state should not be thus precluded from allow-
ing the application of its own Act to provide maximum re-
covery for one of its injured citizens who may become a perma-
nent public charge seems clear. Certainly the rule as thus laid
down by the Court does not square with the policy previously
expounded in the Alaska Packers Case.1
4
The most rceent case involving the problem is Spietz v.
Industrial Commission.- There one Nicola, resident of Wis-
consin, was employed there by Spietz and was later sent to
Montana for temporary employment where he was injured.
After two months in a Montana hospital he returned to Mil-
waukee, in the meantime receiving compensation checks from
Spietz' insurer. Being still totally disabled he filed a claim be-
fore the Montana Accident Board. Subsequently an application
was made in Wisconsin under that state's Act, which allows
greater compensation than that of Montana. Shortly there-
after the Board in the latter state made an award and Spietz
and his insurer appeared specially, pleading it in bar in the
Wisconsin proceeding. The Wisconsin Commission later made
an award which was vacated on review by the circuit court.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin it was held
that under the holding in the McCartin Case the award of the
Montana was res j udicata in that state only and the Wisconsin
Commission was free to allow a recovery under its own Act,
deduction being made of the amount of any payments received
under the Montana award. There is little doubt that the Wis-
consin court was correct in its decision, since the Montana Act
contains no provision such as that found in the Texas statute,
"We have no occasion to consider what effect would be required to be given to
the Texas award if the Texas courts held that an award of compensation in-
another state would not bar an award in Texas for as we have seen Texas does
not allow such a second recovery."
14 The Court in that case said: "The conflict is to be resolved, not by giving
automatic effect to the full faith and credit clause, compelling the court of each
state to subordinate its own statutes to those of the other, but by appraising the
governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision
according to their weight."
15 251 Wis. 168, 28 N. W. (2d) 354 (1947).
COMMENT
nor does it (Montana's) differ perceptibly from that of Illi-
nois."s
It seems a more satisfactory solution to the problem would
be to exempt Workmen's Compensation Acts from the opera-
tion of the full faith and credit clause and allow the states
to apply their own conflict of laws rules as the justice of the
individual cases dictates.
JOHN C. SMITH
Third Year Law Student
University of North Dakota.
SALES - WARRANTIES - DISCLAIMERS - EFFECTIVENESS
AS TO VARIETY IN A SALE OF SEEDS BY DESCRIPTION
While traditional contract freedom has become increasingly
limited by statutory regulation, contracting parties have taken
various means to couterbalance these restrictions. For example,
in the seed and nursery trade dealers have by disclaimer'
absolved themselves of certain statutory warranty respon-
sibilities arising from a sale by description 2. Prevalence of this
practice, both by express provision, and custom, has been
stimulated by virtually universal support of the courts3 ; and
its effectiveness has been denied only by the presence of fraud,
concealment, misrepresentation, negligence 4 , the reluctance
16 "Any employer who elects to pay compensation as provided in this act ...
shall not be subject to any other liability whatsoever for the death of or personal
injury to any employee except as in this act provided; and, except as specifically
provided in this act, all causes of action, actions at law, suits in equity, and pro-
ceedings whatever, and all statutory and common-law rights and remedies for
and on account of such death of, or personal injury to any such employee are
hereby abolished. ... MONT. REV. CODE ANN. (1935) sec. 2838.
1 Seller gives no warranty, express or implied, as to the description, quality,
and productiveness, or any other matter, of any seed they send out, and will not
be in any way responsible for the crop.
2 N. D. REV. CODE, sec. 51-0115 (1943) "... sale of goods by description ...
there is an implied warranty that ...goods . .. correspond with the descrip-
tion."
3 J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Erickson, 21 N. D. 478, 131 N. W. 269;
tynch v. Curfman, 65 Minn. 170, 68 N. W. 5; Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1079 (a seller of
personalty may by an adequately worded provision in his contract of sale exempt
himself from liability as to the description, quality, etc., of the subject-matter
of the sale).
4 Kennedy v. Cornhusker Hybrid Co., 19 N. W. 2d 51 (Neb. 1945) (buyers
lack of notice or knowledge of a disclaimer of warranty does not avoid disclaim-
er, in the absence of express representations, bad faith, fraud or concealment,
if under the circumstances the buyer ought to be aware of the disclaimer); see
also Leonard Seed Co. v. Crary Canning Co., 147 Wis. 166, 132 N. W. 902 (1911).
NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
of a minority group of courts to acquiesce in such complete
irresponsibility,, or appropriate legislative action6 .
The North Dakota Sales Act provides for an implied war-
ranty of identity in a sale by description 7, but antithetically
permits, as do other jurisdictions 9, complete negation of such
warranties by appropriate contract language' ° . But enignati-
cally, Smith v Oscar M. Wills & Co." held that a vendor's pur-
ported compliance with an order for alfalfa seed by providing
sweet clover was not a substantial performance of the contract
and allowed the vendee to recover, despite the presence of a
complete disclaimer of warranty of description 12 ; and in Ward
v Valker it was held that providing plant bulbs different from
those ordered was not a compliance with the vendees request
where there were "anterior circumstances" which "indicated
the existence of an implied warranty," and that such anterior
warranty would not be dispelled by a subsequent disclaimer 14.
In no reported case, however, has North Dakota interpreted
a contract for the sale of seeds or nursery products, in which
a disclaimer was present, and the vendors only failing was that
he supplied a different variety of the same kind of seed
ordered.
Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v Hocking15 held that
5 Rocky Mountain Seed Co. v. Knorr, 92 Colo. 320, 20 P. 2d 304 (1933);
Grafton-Stamps Drug Co. v. Williams, 105 Miss. 296, 62 So. 273 (1913); Wallis
v. Pl-att, [1911] A. C. 394; Howcroft v. Laycock, 14 T. L. R. 46 (1898).
6 Mallery v. Northfield Seed Co., 196 Minn. 129, 264 N. W. 573 (1936) (seller,
after giving the purity and germination percentages of the seed, in compliance
with the statute, could not evade the effect thereof, or the warranty thereby
made, by a subsequent condition that it gave no express or implied warranty);
see Phillips v. Sharp, 44 Ohio App. 311, 185 N. E. 562 (1932).
7 See note 2 supra.
8 N. D. REv. CODE, sec. 51-0172 (1943) "Where any right, duty or liability
would arise under a contract to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may be
negatived or varied by express agreement or by the course of dealing between
the parties, or by custom, if the custom is such as to bind both parties to the
contract or the sale."
9 Burnett v. Hensley, 118 Ia. 575, 92 N. W. 678; Grojean v. Darby, 135 Mo.
App. 586, 116 S. W. 1062; Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1079.
1o N. D. REy. CODE, c. 4-09 (1943) makes it a misdemeanor to knowingly mis-
label seeds.
11 51 N. D. 357, 199 N. W. 861 (1924).
12 Some evidence in this case of a sale by sample or inspection, and there is E
difference of kind of seed as distinguished from variety.
13 44 N. D. 598, 176 N. W. 129 (1920).
14 Is this inconsistent with N. D. Rev. Code, sec. 9-0607 (1943) stating "The
execution of a contract in writing, whether the law requires it to be written or
not, supersedes all the oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter
which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument." See Allgood v.
National Life Ins. Co., 61 N. D. 763, 240 N. W. 874 (1932) "the rule is positive
substantive law."
15 54 N. D. 559, 209 N. W. 996 (1926).
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"parties may exclude and negative all implied warranties
which would arise under the Uniform Sales Act" and "a con-
tract involving a legitimate subject matter, the terms of which
do not inherently tend to be subversive of the public good, or
contrary to good morals, will not, merely because its terms are
harsh as to one of the parties, be declared void and unenforce-
able as contrary to public policy." That statement would indi-
cate that if it were contrary to the interests of the public good,
a disclaimer might not b : enforceable, but this particular
declaration of public policy is confined to farm machinery
salesl'i, indicating that it is aimed at the disclaimer only for
the protection of agricultural interests. Thus, with the de-
clared public policy of the state 7 justifying a negation of such
disclaimers, and Smith v Oscar H. Wills & Co., and Ward. v
Valker indicative of an inclination to avoid the effect of such
disclaimers, but other statutory provisions clearly providing
for the right to include such disclaimers in contracts 8 , a con-
flict exists, which has never been clearly construed by the
North Dakota courts. The construction which would be placed
upon such provisions can only be conjectured under the cir-
cumstances, but a brief review of other jurisdictions indicates
that the numerical weight of authority gives complete validity
to the disclaimer; the principal theory being that parties are
at liberty, within certain bounds, to contract as they see fit"5 .
The cases generally hold such disclaimers to be completely
effective, even as to variety, particularly where the disclaimer
has been clearly, brought to the attention of the buyer and
le N. D. REv. CODE, sec. 51-0707 (1943) "Any person purchasing any ...
harvesting . . . machinery, for his own use shall have a reasonable time after
delivery for . . . testing the same, and if . . . not . . . fit for the purpose for
which it was purchased . . .may rescind the sale. . . .Any provision in any . . .
contract of sale . . .contrary . . . to this section, hereby is declared . . . against
public policy and void." See also Bratberg v. Advance Rumely Threshing Co.,
61 N. D. 452, 238 N. W. 552 (1931), sec. 51-0707 "is designed to effect a public
object, viz., the protection of and the promotion of agriculture within the state."
17 See note 16 supra.
is See notes 2 and 16 supra.
19 Lumbrazo v. Woodruff, 256 N. Y. 92, 175 N. E. 525 (1931); Leonard Seed
Co. v. Crary Canning Co., 147 Wis. 166, 132 N. W. 902, 37 L. R. A. (N.S.) 79 (1911)
"If it be conceded that the contract is one-sided, it must also be conceded that
the parties had a right to make a one-sided contract if they saw fit." See also
Davis Seed Co. v. Bertrand Seed Co., 94 Cal. App. 281, 271 P. 123 (1928), "Any
disclaimer of warranty so expressed that its existence and nature is understood
by the parties to the sale as constituting a term of the bargain operates thus...";
accord, Belt Seed Co. v. Mitchelhill Seed Co., 236 Mo. App. 142, 153 S. W. 2d 106,
160 A.L.R. 365-367.
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he has contracted with it in mind20 . Similar results were found
where the vendee is merely in such a position that he should
have known of the disclaimer, though he may not actually have
known of it- 1. Further, in many jurisdictions, even a custom
to disclaim will be considered part of the contract if known
to the buyer, or presumed to be known by him 22 , and especially
if the buyer has written notice of the custom 23. Others have
found pre-contract expressions of quality to be nothing more
than expressions of opinion and not warranties, when a sub-
sequent disclaimer is made a part of the contract 2 4 , although
similar circumstances have been held to be anterior warranties
not negatived by subsequent disclaimers25.
Only a few jurisdictions have clearly declared that a vendor
cannot disclaim responsibility for providing the exact variety
of seeds ordered26, some on the theory that there must be a
rational construction of such contracts 27 , or that they would
20 Reynolds v. Bind-Stever-s Co., 179 Okla. 628, 67 P. 2d 440 (1937); Gray v.
Gurney Seed and Nursery Co., 62 S. D. 97, 252 N. W. 3 (1933) (dictum); Black
v. B. B. Kirkland Seed Co., 158 S. C. 112, 155 S. E. 268 (1930); J. S. Elder Y.
Applegate, 151 Ark. 565, (1922); Vaughan's Seed Store v. Stringfellow, 56 Fla.
708, 48 So. 410 (1904).
21 Ross v. Northrup King and Co., 156 Wis. 327, 144 N. W. 1124 (1914);
Seattle Seed Co. v. Fujimori, 79 Wash. 123, 139 P. 866 (1914); Blizzard Bros. v.
Growers Canning Co., 152 Ia. 257, 132 N. W. 66 (1911); Kennedy v. Cornhusker
Hybrid Co., 19 N. W. 2d 51 (Neb. 1945) (buyers lack of notice or knowledge of
a disclaimer of warranty does not avoid disclaimer, in absence of express repre-
sentation, bad faith, fraud or concealment, if under the circumstances, buyer
ought to be aware of the disclaimer).
L2 Miller v. Germain Seed Co., 193 Cal. 62, 222 P. 817, 32 A.L.R. 1215 (1924)
(existence of a general custom on the part of seller not to warrant seeds pre-
vents inference of an intent to warrant, whether the custom is known to the
buyer or not) ; see Sutter v. Assoc. Seed Growers, 31 Cal. App. 2d 543, 88 P. 2d
144 (1939) (disclaimer can override implied warranties of fitness, and custom
of trade not to warrant may be part of the contract); National Seed Co. v.
Leavell, 202 Ky. 438, 259 S. W. 1035 (1924); Hoover v. Utah Nursery Co., 79
Utah 12, 7 P. 2d 270 (1932) ; Blizzard Bros. v. Growers Canning Co., 152 Ia. 257,
132 N. W. 66 (1911).
23 Hoover v. Utah Nursery Co., 79 Utah 12, 7 P. 2d 270 (1932), "A long
established generalcustom not to warrant seed is held to be by the law a part of
the contract in a sale of seed, and especially so where the buyer is given written
notice of disclaimer of warranty." But see, Coates v. Harvey et al., 2 N. Y. S. 5
(1888), ". . . custom of the trade in warranting seeds is not competent to change
either the contract of the parties or settled rules of law"; Kotthoff v. Portland
Seed Co., 137 Ore. 152, 300 P. 1029 (1931) (custom of disclaimer not sufficient to
override implied warranties of description).
24 Lynch v. Curfman, 65 Minn. 20, 68 N. W. 5, (1896).
U5 Phillips v. Sharp, 44 Ohio App. 311, 185 N. E. 562 (1932).
26 Kotthoff v. Portland Seed Co., 137 Ore. 152, 300 P. 1029 (1931); Grafton-
Stamps Drug Co. v. Williams, 105 Mss. 296, 62 So. 273 (1913); Wallis v. Pratt,
[1911] A.C. 394; Howcroft v. Laycock, 14 T.L.R. 46 (1898).
27 Howcraft v. Laycock, 14 T. L. R. 46 (1898) "the presence of a dis-
claimer clause does not relieve the seller from the obligation to furnish goods of
the character contracted for in performance of the contract . . . a rational con-
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be contrary to law and justice28 ; others hold that conformance
with description is a condition precedent 29 , and a failure to so
perform would not be a substantial performance 30 . Minnesota
courts have held, under a statute2 1 similar to that in North
Dakota 2, that a vendor cannot disclaim matters contained
on required tags and labels.
North Dakota could, therefore, by following certain of its
own statutory provisions33 permit such disclaimers and be in
accord with the decided numerical weight of authority from
other jurisdictions; but would more appropriately conform to
its own established public policy in regard to agriculture34 by
refusing to give validity to such disclaimers. If such public
policy cannot include a refusal to recognize such disclaimers
because of the lack of express statutory2 or judicial expres-
sion, legislative action should, it is submitted, be forthcoming
to protect agricultrural interests in seed sales in a manner
similar to that of farm machinery, by declaring such dis-
claimers contrary to public policy.
JAMES A. NORDINE
Third Year Law Student
University of North Dakota
struction must be put on the words relied upon, and the construction desired
by the seller was unreasonable.'"
28Grafton-Stamps Drug Co. v. Williams, 105 Miss. 296, 62 So. 273 (1913),
"It would be contrary to law and justice to be able to enforce such a provision."
29 Wallis v. Pratt (1911), A. C. 394, "A disclaimer does not apply to a sale of
seeds by description, but such a sale raises a condition rather than a warranty,
and renders the seller liable for breach of the condition, and such a disclaimer
clause does not cover this liability."
3o Sanford v. Brown Bros. Co., 208 N. Y. 90, 119 N. Y. S. 333, 101 N. E. 797
(1909) (the nurseryman rather than the buyer should assume the responsibility
that nursery products are true to name).
31 1 Mason's Minn. St. 1927, sec. 3957-3, 3957-4. See note 6 supra.
32N.D. REv. CODE, c. 4-09- (1943).
33 See note 8 supra.
34 See note 16 supra.
39 N. D. REV. CODE, c. 4-09 (1943); N. D. REV. CODE, c. 4-20 (1943).
